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Product diversification and debt maturity: An empir ical investigation for the USA. 
By 
MD REZWANOOR RAHMAN 
This study investigates whether product diversified rms tend to have more long- 
term debt compared to non-diversified firms. To conduct this study a sample of 45676 
U.S. based firms was taken from a period of 1969 to 2009. Only firms with operations 
within the United States were considered for this study. Geographic diversified firms 
were excluded for simplicity. The long-term debt level of non-diversified firms was 
compared with product diversified firms for various product lines, and the results showed 
that product diversified firms do have more long term debt compared to non-diversified 
firm’s debt. Additionally debt levels increase with the increase in the number of products. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background: 
In finance, from an investor’s point of view, diversification means to hold a 
portfolio of stocks with different correlations among the stocks. The main purpose is to 
minimize the systematic risk and to compensate the loss of one stock with profits from 
another. From a firms point of view it might want to diversify its business or operations 
to reduce the bankruptcy or default risk, to increase the growth potential of the company 
and/or to maintain a steady profit margin. A firm can diversify its business by increasing 
product lines and operating within the same country or they can also expand their 
operations across different countries. 
Financing structure also plays a crucial role on a firm’s diversification strategy as 
it has various options to finance its business activities, but the most common is equity 
debt financing. In debt financing a firm might decide to take short-term debt and/or long-
term debt. In general, short-term debts are liabilities which are paid within a year, 
whereas long-term debts are liabilities with a duration of more than 1 year. 
We live today in a globalized world. Cross-border trade is a common 
phenomenon and it also allows firms to operate in various markets, targeting different 
customers, which leads to diversification being an important topic for most of the firms 
and grabs the attention of researchers. The literature has a rich array of research to 
explain why firms might want to diversify their business. To name some of this research 
work which has tried to explain a firm’s choice on product diversifications can include,  
agency theory (Jensen, 1986), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975), the 
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resource- based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959), industrial organization (Palepu, 1985) 
and strategic contingency theory (Venkatraman, 1989).  Among these topics, agency 
theory, transaction cost economics and the resource-bas d view of the firm are perhaps 
the most promising.  
According to the resource based view, a firm should attempt to implement an 
effective diversification strategy if it has excess re ources. Agency theory suggests that 
the manager of a firm plays an important role in the decision to implement an effective 
diversification strategy. Diversification generally increases company growth and reduces 
the risk for a firm’s bankruptcy risk, which might lead to a rise in manager’s 
compensation and also diversification minimizes employment risk (Jensen, 1986).  
Finally, according to transaction cost economics, firms diversify to realize benefits of 
economies of scope and economies of internal capital markets (Jones and Hill, 1988).  
“Economies of scope arise when the costs of jointly producing two products are 
lower than the costs of producing them separately”. P-2, (Teece, 1982).  
“In an internal capital market, the corporate headquarters attracts cash flows, 
reallocates them to the most attractive investment proposals of the divisions, and 
monitors their deployment”. P-2, (Williamson, 1975). 
On the other hand we have also seen significant developments to understand the 
firm’s dynamic financing decision. Debt maturity sign ficantly influences the expected 
probability of bankruptcy. According to Dangl and Zechner, 2006. 
“If the costs of financial distress are large and the transactions costs for rolling 
over debt are low, then firm value is generally maximized by choosing short debt 
maturities. If costs of financial distress are low and costs for rolling over debt are 
high, then the indirect benefit for equity holders o iginating from debt reductions 
is negligible compared to the additional transactions costs associated with short-




In this paper the main focus is to link these two important strategies of product 
diversification and financing structure based on short and long-term debt. We would want 
to find out whether any significant trend exists between firms with diversified product 
lines and their financing structure and firms with non-diversified product lines and their 
financing structure. 
1.2 Statement of the problem: 
Research on the relationship between product diversification and capital structure 
is scarce. Some of the earlier studies in this areainclude Barton and Gordon (1987, 1988) 
and Lowe, Naughton and Taylor (1994). The general finding of these studies is that 
industry diversified firms with various product lines tend to have steady net income 
compared to specialized firms. Due to less volatility ndustry diversified firms can choose 
debt with long-term maturity and enjoy more favourable interest rates. But the above 
argument then raises a question which is how many different product lines a firm must 
have to be considered as an industry diversified firm? 
1.3 Purpose of the study: 
The first objective of this study is to determine whether firms with product 
diversification tend to have on average more long-term debt compared to specialized 
firms. To justify product diversification a robust test will be conducted. Diversification 
will be first defined as a firm with more than 1 product line and we will then test to look 
for the pattern. Then diversification will be defined for firms with more than 2 product 
lines and will repeat the test and the findings will be noted and the whole process will be 
repeated, but every time the number of product lines will increase by 1. The second 
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objective is to find a reason why a diversified firm tends to go for longer term debt 
maturity. For the second objective a regression model will be used to support the pattern 
found in the results of the first objective. 
1.4 Justification of the study: 
A lot of research work has been done to find out why firms go for product or 
geographic diversification. Also we have seen some res arch work for the firms financing 
choices and what are the key components that determin  such choices. But very few 
studies are found to test the relationship between a company’s organization structure and 
financing activities. So this study will provide additional empirical evidence to see 
whether any significant trend exists or not between a company’s organization structure 
based on product diversification and financing activities, short-term and long-term debt. 
We will use recent data of U.S. based companies. 
1.5 Organization of the study: 
This study is broken down into five distinct chapters: The current chapter has 
provided a brief review of the research topic and the purpose of the study; Chapter 2 
provides a review of the current literature and the subsequent foundation on which this 
study is built upon; Chapter 3 provides the methodol gy utilized for this study and 
Chapter 4 the empirical results and analysis. Finally Chapter 5 will provide a summary of 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this chapter we will provide a review of the literature which mainly focuses on 
the issue of diversification and leverage and their joint or individual effect on firm’s 
performance or valuation. From the previous research literature we would want to see 
whether product diversification has some favourable eff ct on firm’s performance which 
can lead a firm to go for more debt and a trend betwe n diversified firms and their debt 
maturity compared to specialized firms can be establi hed.   
2.1 Diversification and Leverage: 
Lots of research work for example, “Debt maturity and dynamics of leverage”, 
Dangl and Zechner, 2006, “Governance structure, product diversification and 
performance”, Oijen and Hendrikse, (2002), has been performed separately between the 
association of financial leverage and valuation and diversification and valuation. But not 
a lot of research work is found which considers financial leverage, diversification and 
valuation jointly. Ruland and Zhou, (2005) explained that diversified firms tend to have 
higher free cash flows and fewer high net present value investment opportunities. They 
also found that agency cost is higher for diversified firms due to the higher free cash 
flows. They have also explained that financial leverag  should reduce agency costs for 
diversified firm, which in turn will increase the value of the firm. Their tests also show a 
strong support for their hypothesis which is  
“The value of diversified firms increase with leverage and this tendency is not 
observed for specialized firms”. P-277. 
So it can be concluded that leverage will be more useful for diversified firms compared to 
specialized firms in most of the cases as diversifid rms tend to have more free cash 
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flow and are expected to experience more agency costs. Jensen (1986) shows that 
leverage may be used to reduce free cash flows and the agency costs associated with 
potential over-investment.  
Cash flows and investment opportunities are the two main important criteria 
which vary between diversified firms and specialized firms. Compared to specialized 
firms, diversified firms tend to generate high free cash flows (Whited, 2001). According 
to Ruland and Zhou, 2005, leverage should be more ben ficial for diversified firms to 
reduce agency costs compared to specialized firms as diversified firms tend to carry more 
free cash flows and have less investment opportunities. On the other hand leverage also 
has some negative effect on the firm because the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress 
costs tend to increase with the increase of leverage. But overall leverage contributes to 
the value of diversified firms, but not for specialized firms (Ruland and Zhou, 2005).  
Ruland and Zhou, (2005) used firm-specific financial data from the annual 
database of Standard and Poor’s 2003 Compustat Industrial and Merged Industrial 
Research files. Segment information are obtained from the Compustat Segment files and 
the managerial ownership data are from ExecuComp. They collected data from 1990 to 
2001. The results they found were that diversified rms compared to specialized firms 
use more debt, are larger in size and are more profitable and their statement is also 
consistent with Berger and Ofek (1996). They also confirmed that diversified firms have 
higher cash flows than specialized firms and the capital expenditure are almost same for 
both groups. This finding suggests that diversified rms have increased potential for 
overinvestment relative to specialized firms following the suggestion of Jensen (1986). 
Ruland and Zhou’s (2005) paper suggests that even though leverage has some negative 
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impact on the firm, that problem should be more applicable to specialized firms than to 
diversified firms. Therefore, the theory suggests a higher association between leverage 
and valuation for diversified firms than for specialized firms. 
In my research work I want to determine whether a trend exists in an industry 
diversified firm to have more long term debt compared to specialized firms. Based on 
those previous research works it looks like leverag does have more favourable effects on 
diversified firms compared to specialized (non-diversified firms). If my result shows any 
trend, then I would want to find out why we observe such a trend which can be most 
likely as diversified firms have more free cash flows and less volatile net income. 
Low and Chen, (2004) examined the effect of internatio l and product 
diversification on capital structure with 232 firms from 30 countries. Their results also 
show that product diversification is positively related to financial leverage, indicating that 
such diversification allows firms to reduce their risk, thereby enabling firms to carry 
higher debt level. Their study shows that as with in ernational diversification, product 
diversification is also associated with a reduction in a firm’s business risk. Some of the 
early studies which were performed considered both product diversification with capital 
structure and viewed diversification to be negatively r lated to risk and thus positively 
related to high debt level (see for example Barton and Gordon, 1987, 1988; Lowe, et al, 
1994). With business across several product lines, t income of such a firm is less 
volatile. To test this relationship Low and Chen, (2004) used a hypothesis that there is a 
positive relationship between product diversification and leverage. They found that 
international diversification, unlike product diversification, appears not to be a significant 
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determinant of leverage. Product diversified firms carry higher debt than non-product 
diversified firms. 
Not a lot of research can be found between the relationship of product 
diversification and capital structure. Some of the earlier studies in this area include 
Barton and Gordon (1987, 1988) and Lowe, et al (1994). Most of those studies showed 
that product diversified firms have higher debt ratios due to their low risk level. Some 
other related research conducted include the agency cost of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977), the signaling effect on firm’s quality (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 
1977) and the use of debt to overcome the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986). 
2.2 Effect of Product Diversification on firm’s performance: 
Aswin and George, (2002) studied the diversification strategies of cooperatives 
and compare them with corporations. Oijen and Hendrikse defined corporations as 
“Corporations have shareholders. The shares give them rights to the assets, 
including the rents, of the corporation. The shares can be traded with relative ease. 
The managers of corporations can but do not necessarily h ve to own shares of 
the firm”. P-1. 
And they defined Cooperatives as  
“Cooperatives have members, who have rights to the ass ts, including the rents of 
the cooperative. The rights are difficult to transfer from one member to another. 
In addition, the members are suppliers or customers of the cooperative (or both). 
Cooperatives are managed by managers who are usually not a member of the 
cooperative”. P-1.  
They have used two hypotheses for their research paper. Hypothesis 1: Cooperatives are 
less diversified than corporations and Hypothesis 2: Cooperatives diversify relatively 
more into unrelated activities than corporations do. They used 118 companies for their 
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empirical study. The results of their study had an affirmative answer for the two 
questions they have raised, which is Q1: do the divrs fication strategies of corporations 
and cooperatives differ and Q2: do the diversification strategies of corporations and 
cooperatives have different implications for financial performance? They found that 
cooperatives diversify relatively more into unrelatd activities than corporations do which 
has a negative influence on the performance of cooperatives, whereas it has no influence 
on the performance of corporations. Cooperatives differ from corporations in terms of 
performance, extent and type of product diversification. Therefore, their main conclusion 
is that governance structure does matter for product iversification and its performance.  
The results of extensive empirical analysis of both product and geographical 
diversification effects on performance are inconclusive and contradictory, as Datta, et al 
(1991), and Grant, et al (1988) have discussed at length.  
Another research paper by Tallman and Li, (1996) studied the effect of 
international and product diversification on the performance of the firm. If diversified 
firms have a favourable effect on their performance then it is more likely that they might 
go for more long term debt due to their stability in their performance. So all the research 
that has this finding that diversification has favourable effect on firms performance can 
be used as a strong supportive point for the reason of why diversified firms both 
geographic and product diversified tends to go for longer term debt. One of the 
hypotheses of Tallman and Li, (1996) paper was “Performance should vary positively 
with degree of product diversity.” Their results show that MNE performance increases as 
the diversity index increases, but after a certain poi t, it begins to decrease with further 
diversification. So this suggests that the relationship between product diversification and 
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performance is more complex and does not hold a line r relationship. With a sample of 
large American industrial multinational enterprises (MNEs), it showed a consistent 
quadratic relationship between product diversification and MNE performance but 
minimal performance variations across different measures of international diversification.  
2.3 Firm’s performance and Debt maturity: 
There is evidence from previous research that diversification does have a positive 
effect on a firm’s performance and provides stability on firm’s earnings. Based on the 
results of this research, it can be assumed that diversified firms have better access to 
long-term debt maturity and diversified firms (international and industry diversified 
firms) do go for more long-term debt compared to specialized firms due to favourable 
interest rates, steady income and other factors such as size, liquidity etc. Schiantarelli and 
Sembenelli, (1995) investigated the determinants and co sequences of the maturity 
structure of debt using data from a panel of U.K. and Italian firms. They found that 
duration plays an important role for firms to choose a maturity structure of debt. They 
conclude that more profitable firms (as measured by the ratio of cash flow to capital) tend 
to have more long-term debt due to the dominant role played by firms' fear of liquidation 
and loss of control associated with short-term debt. Also it reflects that financial markets 
are willing to go for long-term debt based on the income stability and risk level of the 
firm.  
The data do not support the hypothesis that short-term debt through better 
monitoring and control, boosts efficiency and growth. If anything, the results support the 
opposite conclusion. In both countries the data suggest a positive relationship between 
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initial debt maturity and the firms' subsequent medium-term performance in terms of 
profitability and growth in real sales. In both countries, total factor productivity depends 
positively on the length of debt maturity. They document the relationship between firms' 
characteristics and their choice of shorter or long-term debt by estimating a maturity 
equation and interpreting the results in light of insights from the theoretical literature, and 
by analyzing the effects of maturity on firms' later p rformance in terms of profitability, 
growth, and productivity. 
On the other hand, it is also important to know whether all those research result 
still hold in recent times, especially after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Kuppuswamy 
and Villalonga, (2010), show that diversified firms value actually increased in that crisis 
period compared to single segment specialized firms. The results were not driven by 
firm’s self-selection into the diversified status. In addition, as the financial crisis reflects 
exogenous shocks to external capital markets, theirresults cannot be attributed to 
endogenous differences in firms’ financing constraints. That enables them to provide 
evidence between external financing constraints and corporate diversification.   
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) also found that the increase in value for 
diversified firms did not simply reflect changes in investor sentiment or perceptions, but 
real differences in corporate finance and investmen. The two main factors, which 
increased the value for the diversified firms in the crisis period were: 1) greater access to 
credit markets as a result of the debt coinsurance provided by conglomerates, and 2) 
access to (and/or more efficient use of) internal capital markets. While these financing 
alternatives are always available to diversified firms, the evidence suggests that they 
became particularly valuable during the crisis.   
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From the above discussion, in most of the cases it was found that product 
diversification does create value for the firm by reducing the agency costs, minimizing 
risk, earnings stability etc. The research paper conducted by Jensen (1986) also discussed 
the benefit of debt in reducing the agency cost of free cash flow.  
The main focus of this paper is to link these two important strategies: product 
diversification and financing structure based on short and long term-debt. We wish to 
determine whether any significant trend exists betwe n firms with diversified product 


















Chapter 3: Research Methodology: 
3.1 Sample: 
To conduct this study of product diversification and debt maturities and to 
determine whether diversified firms tend to go for more long-term debt compared to 
specialized firms, two data files have been used: Compustat1950-2010 and file 
173322115. All the data have been collected from S&P Compustat from a period of 1969 
to 2009. Altogether there are 45676 firms and the maxi um number of different product 
line is 33. All firms used in this study are U.S. based firms of various industries.  
One of the main limitations of the data collection s that is that the data collected 
are from only one country, the USA and firms included in the sample are from various 
industries which may have specific and different debt l vels. 
The Compustat1950-2010 file is used in this study to find the short-term and 
long-term debt level of each firm. Short-term debt is defined here as debt with a maturity 
of less than one year and long-term debt is defined as ebt with a maturity of more than 
one year. The description of the Compustat1950-2010 and 173322115 file is given in 
Appendix A.   
3.2 Research Methodology:  
 This study is conducted to test whether any relationship exists between industry 
diversified firms (based on different product lines) and their debt levels compared to 
specialized firms and their debt level. To test the relationship, first two data files 
Compustat1950-2010 and 173322115 were merged to gather information about a firm’s 
14 
 
long-term debt and product lines. The debt level was presented as long-term debt/ Total 
debt where total debt is the sum of long-term debt and short- term debt. The relationship 
between diversified firms and their debt level compared to specialized firms and their 
debt level was tested for any definition of diversification. First firms with single product 
lines were considered as specialized firms and firms with more than 1 product lines were 
considered as diversified firms. And then the whole process was repeated, but each time 
the number of product lines for diversified firms was increased by one as long as it 
reached the maximum product lines of 33. The whole analysis was conducted using the 
STATA program and a robust test was conducted to test th  relationship.  
3.3 The Model: 
 The model used in this study was taken from Ruland and Zhou, (2005) to find a 
reason why diversified firm’s tend to go for more long term debt. The model derived 
from Ruland and Zhou, (2005) is given below: 
Regression model: 3.1 
EV = α1 + β1D + β2 DEBT + β3 D ∗ DEBT + β4 SIZE + β5 EBIT +β6 CAPEX + 
ε………(3.1)  
DEBT is the book value of long-term debt / book value of total assets, and D ∗ DEBT is 
the product of D and DEBT, the interaction term for diversification a d leverage. 
The long-term debt measure is consistent with the view that leverage effectively locks the 
firm into a long-term commitment (Jensen, 1986). 
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In Model (3.1), the association between EV and leverag  for specialized firms is reflected 
by β2. For diversified firms, this association is reflected by β2+β3.  
Β2 should have a negative sign and as the hypothesize is that leverage is more beneficial 
for diversified firms; β3 is predicted to have a positive sign. 
Hypothesis: 
H0: Product diversified firms tend to go for more long-term debt compared to specialized 
firms. 


















Chapter 4 Results and Findings: 
This study provides an analysis to find a trend betwe n product diversified firm’s 
and debt maturity compared to specialized firms and debt maturity. To test the 
relationship and to comply with any definition of diversification, a robust test was 
conducted using Stata programing. First a firm with one product line was considered to 
be a specialized firm and firms with more than one product lines were considered as 
diversified firms. Then the debt level of each firm was compared. Second a firm with one 
product lines was considered to be a specialized firm and firms with more than two 
product lines were now considered to be diversified an  again their debt levels were 
compared. The whole process was repeated and each time the number of product lines for 
diversified firms was increased by one until it reached the maximum product lines of 33. 
Each time the debt level between diversified firms and specialized firms was noted and it 
was found that every time the number of product lines was increased for diversified 
firms, the debt level also increased compared to specialized firms. So based on the results 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis, H0: Product diversified firms tend to go for more 
long-term debt compare to specialized firms. 
Also another important trend found in this study was the risk indicator. The risk 
indicator is tested by measuring the net income volatility of the firm. It was found that for 
product diversified firms, first the risk level of the firm increased with the increase of 
debt as more product lines were added. Then at one level, with the increase of both debt 
and product lines, the risk level of the firm decreas d. And for the specialized firm it was 
always upward trend as more debt increased.  
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All the results are presented in Table 4.1 below: 
Number of 



















          
1 and above 54.11524 63.84166 519.9091 1061.072 
2 and above 55.7235 64.38699 471.3882 1110.809 
3 and above 55.29716 68.29152 456.9261 1279.988 
4 and above 56.85828 68.19391 554.2111 1308.554 
5 and above 57.65048 68.19526 587.0576 1339.59 
6 and above 58.19864 68.91773 627.3738 1390.865 
7 and above 58.40364 69.20981 641.5922 1413.495 
8 and above 58.62665 69.52274 652.8324 1442.764 
9 and above 59.2242 71.19173 678.1353 1576.773 
10 and above 59.47728 71.59394 699.7957 1613.539 
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11 and above 59.66658 71.93613 703.2231 1663.839 
12 and above 60.53696 72.49197 727.3952 1902.354 
13 and above 60.7158 72.58422 731.8728 1978.709 
14 and above 60.89323 72.76271 740.3457 2067.77 
15 and above 61.32648 73.24854 780.68 2324.281 
16 and above 61.45525 73.25119 793.6352 2427.55 
17 and above 61.5738 73.0764 803.1427 2547.379 
18 and above 61.81772 72.61353 833.3247 2888.369 
19 and above 61.86096 72.89329 852.6809 2918.673 
20 and above 61.87773 74.44898 856.2626 3146.126 
21and above 62.00461 73.67375 934.8074 2616.148 
22 and above 62.02726 74.22361 954.0884 2340.079 
23 and above 62.05424 74.03007 976.798 1679.157 
24 and above 62.0918 74.69401 981.144 1681.606 
25 and above 62.11162 74.12177 983.1458 1676.803 
26 and above 62.12263 74.20198 984.8566 1678.75 
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27 and above 62.15467 71.90874 985.717 1897.558 
28 and above 62.15841 73.22002 987.6824 1847.944 
29 and above 62.16624 72.17664 987.8761 1952.085 
30 and above 62.17825 71.98016 991.662 1526.602 
31 and above 62.17939 76.20829 992.717 817.7213 
32 and above 62.18101 84.21353 992.872 766.0206 
33 and above 62.18737   993.0383   
 
Table: 4.1: Long-term debt for product diversified firms and non-diversified firms and 
risk indicators. 
From the above Table 4.1 we can discern a clear trend that product diversified 
firms do tend to go for more long-term debt compared to non-diversified firms. Also we 
can see an intersecting trend of the risk indicator which initially increases for the product 
diversified firms and then it gradually decreases as more product lines are added. On the 






Figure 4.1: Long-term debt level of diversified firms compared to non-diversified firms  
Figure 4.1 above also shows that when we consider firms with 2 or more product 
lines to be diversified and firms with 1 product lines to be non-diversified, then the long-
term debt level is greater compared to non-diversifi d firms. This phenomenon continues 
for all levels of diversification. When we consider firms with product lines 32 or above 
are diversified and firms with 1 product lines are non-diversified, we still find the same 
result that product diversified firms go for more long-term debt compared to non-
diversified firms. And the more the product lines are dded, the higher the debt level rises 
























































































































































































Number of product lines for diversified firms 
Long-term debt level of diversified firms compared to non-diversified 
firms  
Long-term debt percentage
of non-diversified firms (%)
Long-term debt percentage
of diversified firms (%)
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One of the main reasons why product diversified firms go for more debt is less 
volatility of net income and the paper Debt, Diversification and Valuation conducted by 
Ruland and Zhou, 2005 also showed that the values of Diversified firms increase with 
leverage and this tendency is not observed for specialized firms.  
 The results of equation (3.1), EV = α1 + β1D + β2 DEBT + β3 D ∗ DEBT + β4 
SIZE + β5 EBIT +β6 CAPEX + ε,  showed that while leverage also has negative 
implications for valuation, these problems should be more applicable to specialized firms 
than to diversified firms. Therefore, the theory suggests a higher association between 
leverage and valuation for diversified firms than for specialized firms. So this study 












Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendation: 
This study was conducted using a sample of 45676 firms, which have different 
product lines from 1 to 33. Data were collected from 1969 to 2009 and all the firms were 
from the United States. Firms with production line outside U.S were excluded. 
The main purpose of this empirical study was to see wh ther product diversified 
firms tend to have more long-term debt compared to non-diversified firm’s long-term 
debt levels. Non-diversified debt levels were compared with all possible product lines to 
be considered as diversified. And the results show a clear trend that diversified firms do 
have more long-term debt compared to non-diversified firms. To find a reason why 
diversified firms tend to have more debt levels a model was derived from Ruland and 
Zhou, (2005) which shows that the values of diversified firms increase with leverage and 
this tendency is not observed for specialized firms.  
 One limitation of this present study is that firms from different industries were 
considered for this study but we know that operations and debt levels vary by industry. 
Another limitation of this study was only including firms having different product lines 
operating within the U.S. So all the multinational firms, having product lines in different 
countries were excluded. So considering those two limitations, this study can be 
improved in the future and that will give a more prcise and clearer picture between the 
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Appendix: A:  
Description of Compustat 1950-2010 file: 
variable name variable label 
  
gvkey Compustat firm identifier 
fyear Data Year - Fiscal 
year Compustat data year, may be different from 
the fiscal year 
act Current Assets - Total 
aedi Accrued Expenses and Deferred Income 
at Assets - Total 
capx Capital Expenditures 
ceq Common/Ordinary Equity - Total 
che Cash and Short-Term Investments 
csho Common Shares Outstanding 
dlc Debt in Current Liabilities - Total 
dltt Long-Term Debt - Total 
27 
 
dp Depreciation and Amortization 
dv Cash Dividends (Cash Flow) 
dvt Dividends - Total 
ib Income Before Extraordinary Items 
lct Current Liabilities - Total 
prstkc Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock 
sale Sales/Turnover (Net) 
txdb Deferred Taxes (Balance Sheet) 
prcc_c Price Close - Annual - Calendar 
prcc_f Price Close - Annual - Fiscal 
q Duchin (2010) Tabin's q measure 
sic Four-digit SIC for the firm 
cf_at Cash flow to Total assets following Duchin 
(2010) 
ni Net Income (Loss) 





Description of 173322115 file: 
Variable name variable label 
  
gvkey Standard & Poor's Indentifier 
dnum Standard Industry Classification Code 
cnum CUSIP Issuer Code 
cic CUSIP Issue Number and Check Digit 
coname Company Name 
smbl Ticker Symbol 
incorp Incorporation ISO Country Code 
naics N. American Ind. Classification Sys. Code 
gic Global Industry Code 
srcyr Source Year 
srcfyr Source Fiscal Year End Month 
stype Segment Type 
sid Segment Identifier 
year Data Year 
29 
 
fyr Data Fiscal Year End Month 
cyr Calendar Year 
sale Net Sales (MM$) 
oibd Operating Income Before Deprec (MM$) 
dp Depreciation and Amortization (MM$) 
oiad Operating Income After Deprec (MM$) 
capx Capital Expenditures (MM$) 
at Identifiable/Total Assets (MM$) 
eqearn Equity in Earnings (MM$) 
inveq Investments at Equity (MM$) 
emp Employees (Actual) 
rd Research and Development (MM$) 
obklg Order Backlog (MM$) 
export Export Sales (MM$) 
intseg Intersegment Eliminations (MM$) 
pi Pretax Income (MM$) 
ib Income Before Extraordinary Items (MM$) 
30 
 
ni Net Income (Loss) (MM$) 
ops Operating Profit (MM$) 
salef Footnote - Sales 
opincf Footnote - Operating Profit 
capxf Footnote - Captial Expenditures 
eqearnf Footnote - Equity in Earnings 
empf Footnote - Employees 
rdf Footnote - Research and Development 
sname Segment Name 
soptp1 Operating Segment Type 1 
soptp2 Operating Segment Type 2 
sgeotp Geographic Segment Type 
snaics1 First NAICS Code this segment 
snaics2 Second NAICS Code this segment 
ssic1 First SIC Code this segment 
ssic2 Second SIC Code this segment 
ssicb1 Segment SIC Code #1 (Source: SEGSICB data set) 
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ssicb2 Segment SIC Code #2 (Source: SEGSICB data set) 
srccyr Calendar Year 
ssrce Source Document Code 
sucode Update Code 
hnaics Primary Historical NAICS 
curcd ISO Currency Code 


















*Starting with the data sorting* 




*Loading the file, and excluding Geographic segments* 
set memory 1g 
use "C:\Users\User\Desktop\MRP data\new\173322115.dta" 
keep if stype=="BUSSEG" 
 
 
*Getting the maximum number of segment of each firm* 
*Identifying the firm by gvkey* 
*Excluding unuseful data in order to save memory* 
bysort gvkey year: gen maxnum=_N 
keep gvkey year sid maxnum sale oibd 
 
 
*Creating a variable to indicate if a firm is diversified* 
*When div=1, the firm is diversified* 
 
gen div=0 
replace div=1 if maxnum>1 
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save Mpart1, replace 
 
*Starting to merge data from another file* 
*Gathering the information of debts* 
clear all 
use "C:\Users\User\Desktop\MRP data\new\compustat1950_2010.dta" 
sort gvkey year 
merge gvkey year using Mpart1 
drop _merge 




*Gathering the amount of total debt* 
*Variable td is the total debt of the firm* 
*Calculating td by adding long-term and current debt* 
gen td= dltt+ dlc 
drop if td==. 
sort gvkey year 
 
*Getting the percentage of long-term debt in total debt* 
*Variable longper is the long-term percentage* 
gen longper= dltt/td 
 






while `i'<=mbs { 
quietly replace div=1 if maxnum>`i' 
quietly replace div=0 if maxnum<=`i' 
quietly bysort div: gen sumper=sum( longper) 
quietly sum sumper if div==0 
scal non_div_per=r(max) 
*Getting the number of firms in each group* 
 
quietly bysort div: gen firmnumber=_N 
quietly sum sumper if div==1 
scal div_per=r(max) 
*Getting the equally weighted average long-term percentage* 
*of each group* 
quietly gen percentage=non_div_per/ firmnumber if div==0 
quietly replace percentage=div_per/ firmnumber if div==1 
 
*Evaluating the valitility of the net income of each firm* 
*Then, evaluating the standard diviation of the valitility* 
*the standard diviation is the risk indicator, variable risk_ind* 
quietly bysort gvkey: egen risk=sd(ni) 
quietly bysort div: egen risker=sd(risk) 
*quietly gen risk_ind=risker/ firmnumber if div==0 
35 
 
*quietly replace risk_ind=risker/ firmnumber if div==1 
quietly sum percentage if div==0 
scal non_per=r(max) 
quietly sum percentage if div==1 
scal div_per=r(max) 
quietly sum risker if div==0 
scal non_risk=r(max) 
quietly sum risker if div==1 
scal div_risk=r(max) 
dis "The longterm debt percentage of non-diversified rms is: " non_per 
dis "The longterm debt percentage of diversified firms is: " div_per 
dis "The risk indicator of non-diversified firms is: " non_risk 
dis "The risk indicator of diversified firms is: " div_risk 
 





*Draw the relationship between diversification and risk indicator* 
*twoway (line div risk_ind) 








*set more off 
*sort gvkey year 
*bysort gvkey year: gen n=_n 













*while `i' <= yrmax { 
*gen last=div if year==`i'-1 & gvkey==`k' 
*sum last 
*gen f=r(max) 
*replace last_div= f if year==`i' & gvkey==`k' 
*drop f 
*drop last 
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*local i=`i'+1 
*} 
*local k=`k'+1 
*}  
 
